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COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EFFORTS TO DISMISS
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS FOR LOYALTY REASONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years many federal legislative committees, and even some
committees of the state governments, have been investigating Com-
munism. Next to Federal Government employees, educators are most
frequently under scrutiny.' This is because it is recognized that the
Communist theory is that one of the most fertile grounds for im-
planting subversive doctrines is the minds of the young. Investigation
of teacher activities has given rise to the use of techniques to determine
loyalty which have raised issues under the due process clause of the
constitution. Also the scrutiny has often resulted in dismissal efforts
which raise due process issues. The endeavor of this article is to
analyze the constitutional issues so raised.
The scope of this article is largely limited to public school teachers.
2
Only incidental attention is given to other public employees.
II. RIGHT TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
In moving to think about the constitutional rights of teachers it is
imperative in the first instance to think about the teacher's right to
public employment.
There can be no inchoate right to employment in the public schools
as a teacher. 3 If this were not so, anyone and everyone could demand
such a position since all enjoy the same rights under the constitution.
1 In the year 1953 alone the House Un-American Activities Committee received
testimony of 280 witnesses leading to accusations against approximately 100
past or present teachers. In public session, the Sub-committee on Internal
Security of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Jenner Committee) heard
more than one hundred witnesses in the field of education, eighty-two of
whom invoked the privilege against self incrimination. While the committees
have no power to prosecute, the Jenner Committee reported that in all but a
few instances, University officials or local authorities suspended the teacher
who used the privilege before them. See Finkelkor and Stockdale, The Pro-fessor and the Fifth Amendment, 16 U. PiTT. L. Rnv. 355 (1956).
2 The term as used here includes both publicly employed grade and high school
teachers and professors in state supported colleges and universities. The de-
cisions make no distinction between these cases and logic would call for none.
Obviously since parochial school teachers and professors in privately endowed
colleges are outside the realm of public employment, the considerations are so
different as to preclude the examination of their status in this article. See
Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 763, 126 N.E.2d 100 (1955).
3 78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts §154 (1952). 47 Am. JUR. Schools
§114 (1943). Also see Board of Education of City of Los Angeles v. Wilkin-
son, 125 Cal. App. 2d 100, 270 P. 2d 82 (1954); Faxon v. School Committee
of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954) ; Lanier v. Catahoula Parish
School Board, 179 La. 462, 154 So. 469 (1934); Note, 94 A.L.R. 1484. The
refusal of a school board to engage the professional services of a teacher is
not a denial of the latter's constitutional right to follow his chosen profession.
Seattle High School Chapter v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930).
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To state the proposition is to refute it. The law was succintly stated
in Coleman v. School District of Rochester.4
.. . [N]o constitutional issue of personal rights is involved.
No one has a guaranteed or vested right to become or to con-
tinue in a position as a public school teacher. . . . The Legis-
lature, if it saw fit, might enact that teachers should be elected
by popular vote. . . . The scope of legislative authority in the
premises is virtually untrammeled and unhampered.
This is in accord with the general principal that there is no right
to public employment.5 This is necessary in order that all governmental
bodies may be able to keep the public force down to the proper ef-
fective size and to provide for efficient internal management.
But to say that there is no abstract right to public employment
means only that a teacher can not demand employment from the gov-
ernment. Since the government must employ someone, everyone has
a right to be eligible to work for the governmentAc A person does not
necessarily have to be employed, but he can not arbitrarily be classified
as ineligible.
Furthermore, the government can not be discriminatory in its hiring
procedure. In Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los
Angeles 7 it was stated:
Surely a government could not exclude from public employ-
ment members of a minority group merely because they are
odious to the majority nor restrict such employment, say, to
native born citizens. To describe public employment as a privi-
lege does not meet the problem.8
487 N.H. 465, 183 Atl. 586 (1936). As a practical matter, however, rights are
given to teachers by teacher tenure statutes; hence no constitutional issues are
ordinarily raised. Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7,
58 N.W. 1042 (1894). 47 AMi. JuR. Schools §125 (1943). Also see Public
School District v. Halson, 31 Ariz. 291, 252 Pac. 509 (1927) ; Marion v. Board
of Education, 97 Cal. 606, 32 Pac. 643 (1893); Potts v. Morehouse Parish
School Board, 177 La. 1103, 150 So. 290 (1933); Ansorge v. Green Bay, 198
Wis. 320, 224 N.W. 119 (1929) ; Baird v. School District, 41 Wyo. 451, 287
Pac. 308 (1930).
5 City of Detroit v. Div. 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Railway
and Motor Coach Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952); Angilly
v. United States, 199 F.2d 642 (2nd Cir. 1952); Frankfurter, concurring and
dissenting in Garner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341
U.S. 716 (1951) ; Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the history of the "spoils system" of
government employment is explained and the purpose and effect of the Civil
Service Statutes are considered. For the attitude of the United States Gov-
ernment (as an employer) in this matter see Emerson and Halfield, Loyalty
Among Government Employees, 58 YALE L. J. 1 (1948). To the effect that
there is in general no legal right to contract with the government, see Per-
kins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
6 Nelson, Public Employees' Political Activity, 9 VAND. L. REv. 27 (1956).
7341 U.S. 716 (1951).
s 341 U.S. at 725. To the effect that Congress may not enact a regulation pro-
viding that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to public office
see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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Once a person is employed by the government, he has certain
rights which must be protected. In Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education of City of New York9 the Supreme Court of the United
States dealt with the manner in which a public school teacher may be
discharged for loyalty reasons.' It was recognized in that case that,
* ' * To state that a person does not have a constitutional
right to government employment is only to say that he must
comply with reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory terms
laid down by the proper authorities."
The famous statement of Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford 2 has been relied on in many cases to sustain the dis-
charge of a teacher for loyalty reasons. 13
* * * The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. 1 4
However even this case recognized that the state's employing power
is subject to the limitations that its terms for hiring and discharging
employees must be reasonable and non-discriminatory. Holmes went
on to state,
There are few employments for hire in which the servant
does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech
as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered him. On the same principal the city
may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within
its control. [Emphasis supplied.] 15
The discussion in this section leads to the conclusion that due
process is an issue, and that every discharge can not be sustained
automatically. 16 The relevant considerations in determining constitu-
tionality will be discussed later.
9 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
10 This case will be thoroughly analyzed infra, part VB.
11 350 U.S. at 555. This doctrine was not new to the court. It was foreshadowed
in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), where it was said that
school teachers had no right to work for the state on their own terms. They
could be employed on the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities;
if they did not wish to do so, they could go elsewhere. That a school teacher
may not be arbitrarily dismissed was recognized in Wieman v. Updergraff,
344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952), where it was stated, "We need not pause to con-
sider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient
to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose
exclusion ... is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
12 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
'3 Annot. 44 A.L. R. 2d 789 (1955).
34 29 N.E. at 517.
15 Id., at 517-518.
36 Board of Education of City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d
261 (1953); Pickus v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 9 Ill.2d 599,
138 N.E.2d 532 (1956); Reinecke v. Laper, 77 F. Supp. 333 (D.C. Hawaii
1948). To like effect see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951); United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947) ; Emerson and Helfield, supra, note 5.
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The constitutional relationship existing between a public school
teacher and the Board of Education 7 was clearly analyzed in a case
in which negro school teachers sought to force the Board to pay them
salaries commensurate with those received by white teachers:
* . . As teachers holding certificates from the state, plaintiffs
have acquired a professional status. It is true that they are not
entitled by reason of that fact alone to contracts to teach in the
public schools of the state; for whether any particular one of
them shall be employed is a matter resting in the sound dis-
cretion of the school authorities .... [T]hey are qualified school
teachers and have the civil right, as such, to pursue this pro-
fession without being subjected to discriminatory legislation on
account of race or color. It is no answer to this to say that the
hiring of any teacher is a matter resting in the discretion of the
school authorities. Plaintiffs as teachers qualified and subject to
employment by the state, are entitled to apply for the positions
and to have the discretion of the authorities exercised lawfully
and without unconstitutional discrimination. .... 18
An analysis of these considerations, with an attempt to reconcile
them, leads to certain conclusions. A person does not have a right to
a job as a school teacher in the sense that he may demand the position.
However, he does have a right to be eligible for the job, to be con-
sidered for it by the board. Whether or not he or someone else is
selected is in the sound discretion of the board, but that discretion is
not unbounded. It may be exercised only within the area of reasonable
qualifications for the position in question. Obviously a rule or statute
clearly showing discrimination in hiring policies could not withstand
judicial attack.' 9
As a corollary to the rule of equal treatment in selection of public
servants, there is the rule of equal treatment in their discharge. If a
person has a right to be considered for the job on equal terms, he has
a right to retain the job on equal terms. But the discretion of the
employing agency is so broad and there is such a strong presumption
of official regularity2" that the courts, unless required by tenure legis-
lation, will not inquire into the justification for a discharge for which
'7 The public authority employing the teacher may be designated under local
law in various ways: Board of Education, School Board, School District,
Board of Trustees, etc. The term "Board of Education" will, unless otherwise
indicated, be used here to designate the local school authority, regardless of
what its official designation may be. This will also apply to officials of state
managed universities.
's Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992, at 996 (1940).
19 In Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951), it was stated
by Frankfurter, concurring, "But doubtless unreasonable discrimination if
avowed in formal law, would not survive constitutional challenge."
20 Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1957), "The court will
not review managerial acts, not clearly arbitrary, of executive officials per-
forming within the scope of their authority, and will not substitute theirjudgment in such matters for that of the officials."
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the government does not give a reason. (But in practice, tenure
statutes do require that the Board of Education must state the reasons
for its action when it releases a teacher.) When a "qualifiication" is
set forth in a rule or formal law that has no reasonable relation to the
position in question, it will not be allowed to stand.2 1 When the case
for a dismissal is given, that cause must be adequate in the face of
judicial inquiry. This analysis would seem to explain the cases herein-
before considered.
III. THE RELATION OF TEACHER TO PUPIL AND
PUBLIC AS A FACTOR IN DISCHARGE
To train the pupil properly for a full and useful life the teacher
needs more than academic qualifications. He must instill in a student
the ideals necessary for good citizenship.2 2 The courts have recognized
this in dealing with the discharge of teachers:
The competency of a teacher does not depend alone upon
academic equipment. With technical qualifications for the po-
sition must go character, moral fiber, and respect for the glori-
ous traditions of the teaching professions. Without these at-
tributes a teacher is but a speaking blackboard or a walking
textbook. A teacher must not only teach, he must inspire the
boys and girls who look to him, in addition to classroom in-
struction, for moral and inspirational guidance.2 3
The teacher's duty of teaching the all-important ideals does not
cease when he leaves the school building. Children respect their teach-
ers and look to them for guidance. Their immature minds are in-
fluenced not only by what is actually taught in the classroom but also
by the personality of their teacher.2 4 A teacher instructs not by words
alone, but also by precept and example. 25 A person who by example
would teach his students lessons they should not learn is not fit to be
a teacher, regardless of his academic qualifications. These facts are
recognized by the courts:
But the teacher is intrusted with the custody of children and
their high preparation for useful life. His habits, his speech,
his good name, his cleanliness, the wisdom and propriety of his
unofficial utterance, his association, all are involved [in deter-
mining his usefulness]. His ability to inspire children and to
govern them, his power as a teacher, and the character for which
2 Note, Mandatory Dismissal of Public Personnel and The Privilege Against
Self Incrimination, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1190 (1953).2 2 Davis v. The University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955);
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Goldsmith v. Board of
Education of Sacramento, 66 Cal. App. 157, 225 Pac. 783 (1924).
23 Kaplan v. School District of Philadelphia, 388 Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 762 (1957).
24 Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952); Comment, A Defense of
Teacher Dismissal for Clainting The Privilege Against Self Incrimination,
1955 U. ILL. L. FoRUm 611.
25 State ex. rel. Schweitzer v. Turner, 155 Fla. 270, 19 So.2d 832 (1945) ; Kaplan
v. School District, 388 Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 672 (1957).
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he stands are matters of major concern in a teacher's selection
and retention. . . . There may be causes for the removal of a
teacher affecting the discipline of the school over which he
presides entirely outside of any question of his learning, ability,
power of enforcing discipline, or moral qualities .... 21
A teacher's acts outside of the classroom may have the joint effect
of setting bad example for students and undermining the confidence
of the public in the school system. In McLellan v. Board of President
and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools,27 the teacher's wife filed
a cross bill in a divorce action alleging adultery by her husband with
various women, and other gross indignities toward her. The news-
papers commented on this in editorials. Consequently, when it came
to a question of the right of the Board to discharge, the court upheld
the discharge saying,
It was not for the Board of directors to prejudge, or even
to examine, the charges brought against this teacher by his
wife, but the mere fact that charges of this character were
brought against him and that the fact had become notorious,
rendered it highly inexpedient that he should remain as a
teacher of higher classes frequented by youths between the ages
of fourteen and twenty. . . . Such would be the common
sense of all fathers and mothers having a parental regard for
the morals of their children."
In such a case it is the notoriety of the alleged fact that is ground
for removal. The truth of the fact itself is immaterial. In justice to
the teacher the Board of Education should not by its hasty action im-
ply credence in rumors that prove to be unfounded, and give the
power of discharge to the scandal monger. It should allow the teacher
a reasonable time to meet and refute any allegations against him. But
if the teacher has not been able to clear his name in the minds of the
public, he is no longer qualified for continued employment. The fact
that the charge may be untrue, and that the teacher has been wronged
by another is of no consequence in considering his qualifications for
continued employment. The situation is analagous to that where a
. Board of Education of City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546, 261 P.2d
261 (1953). If a teacher does acts or makes statements outside of the class-
room that would tend to undermine the patriotism of the students, he is
subject to dismissal. State ex. rel. Schweitzer v. Turner, 155 Fla. 270, 19
So.2d 832 (1945) (Making public statement that he would not bear arms in
time of war) ; McDowell v. Board of Education of N.Y., 104 Misc. 564, 172
N.Y.S. 590 (1918) (making statement that he would not resist invasion and
would not urge students to do so) ; Joyce v. Board of Education of Chicago,
325 Ill. App. 543, 60 N.E.2d 431 (1945) (urging former student to avoid the
draft). Obviously, making statements to class that the U.S.S.R. had the best
government and the United States the worst, that the United States was
the worst, that the United States was the aggressor in every war, and that it
took advantage of smaller nations was ground for dismissal. Board of Edu-
cation of Eureka v. Jewett, 21 Cal. App.2d 64, 68 P.2d 404 (1937).
27 15 Mo. App. 362 (1884).
28 Id., at 365.
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person may have innocently contracted a communicable disease and
has to be discharged. The Board's sole interest is in his qualifications,
not in the source of their deprivation. 9
The public's confidence in the school system is essential if the sys-
tem is to do an effective job.30 A teacher who creates suspicion in the
minds of the public as to his own or the system's competency is not
fit to remain a teacher. This was recognized in Faxon v. School Com-
mittee of Boston,3 1 where the court upheld the dismissal of a school
teacher who refused to answer question of a congressional sub-commit-
tee as to loyalty to the government. The court stated:
But the question here is not one of guilt or innocence. It is
a question of administration by a public school board in the
public interest. Neither the school committee nor the court
exists in a vacuum. Neither can profess ignorance of the cur-
rents of opinion which sway great masses of the people. It
cannot be doubted that multitudes of people in the community
regard with abhorrence the Communist Party.... Nothing the
courts can do or say will prevent the public from drawing its
own inferences from refusals to testify. . . . The school com-
mittee could find that a great many parents and others would
be seriously disturbed if the petitioner were allowed to con-
tinue teaching, and that this could undermine public confidence
and react unfavorably upon the school system. Considering the
position of the petitioner entirely apart from any question of
fault on his part and as if he had merely suffered some mis-
fortune, such as a terribly disfiguring personal injury, the best
interests of the school are paramount .... 32
IV. DISLOYALTY AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
It seems axiomatic that the government could not be forced to
retain in its employ a person disloyal to it and actively seeking its
violent overthrow. Indeed, this would seem so basic that the number
of cases in which this proposition has been challenged is startling.
The question ordinarily comes up in relation to the state's power to
inquire as to the loyalty of its employees as a necessary qualification
for continued employment. The United States Supreme Court gave
its answer in Garner v. Board of Public Works:
We think that a municipal employer is not disabled because
it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as
to matters that may prove revelant to their fitness and suit-
ability for the public service. Past conduct may well relate to
29 Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. REV.
603 (1951).30 Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 785, 127 N.E.2d 663 (1955) ; Beilan v. Board
of Education, 78 Sup. Ct. 1317 (1958); Harlan, dissenting in Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; Spence, dissenting in Board
of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956). But see Board of
School Directors v. Gilies, 343 Pa. 382, 23 A.2d 447 (1942).
31331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
32 Id., at 774.
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present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship
to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into
in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private
industry 33 and are not less relevant in public employment.34
The Garner case involved civil service employees. That loyalty
should be required of all civil servants seems all the more reasonable
when it is rcmembered that at common law an agent owed his prin-
cipal a duty of loyalty and fidelity.35 It could hardly be said that the
constitution could abrogate such a fundamental rule of the law of
Agency when applied to the states.
One more ground could be urged for the above principle. Present
disloyalty which is a basis for discharge is now a crime.36 Certainly
the government, state or federal, can not be forced to keep in its em-
ploy one who is a criminal.
The importance of loyalty in a teacher has been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court which said, in Adler v. Board of Edu-
cation :
33An examination of arbitration reports indicate that even present membership
in Communist Party is not ground for dismissal under "just cause" provisions
in Collective bargaining agreements in private industry, in the absence of
special circumstances. Comment, Is Invocation of the Fifth Amendment or
Alleged Subversive Activities "Just Cause" for Dismissal of a Privately
Employed Individual?, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 745 (1957). But see Black v.
Cutler Lab, 351 U.S. 292 (1957).
3 341 U.S. at 720. This result has been reached in many cases. Fitzgerald v.
City of Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 379, 102 A.2d 887 at 890 (1954) : "No employee
of a government agency, whether teacher, nurse, or anyone else, should be
allowed, while in such employ to disseminate disloyal and seditious doctrines
or encourage their spread by membership in a subversive organization."
(This case applied to a nurse, but recognized that there would be more
compelling reasons in the case of a teacher.) See Wormuth, supra, note 29.
This qualification for teachers has been recognized in many cases. Laba v.
The Board of Education of Newark, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957) ; The
Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956); Steinmetz
v. Calif. State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955) ; Pickus
v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 9 Ill.2d 599, 438 N.E.2d 532(1956); Laguna Beach United School District v. Lewis, 146 Cal. App.2d 69,
305 P.2d 59 (1956) ; Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952).
Also see cases cited, infra, note 39.
35 MECHEM, AGENCY §500 (4th ed. 1952).
36 70 STAT. 623, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385: "Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates,
abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
destroying the government of the United States or the government of any
State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any
political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assasination of
any officer of any such government; or
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence, or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliates with any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purpose thereof -
"Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof for the next 5 years next following his
conviction."
Past disloyalty, including membership in a subversive organization with
knowledge of its purpose, is ground for discharge on the theory that it is
a reasonable indication of present disloyalty.
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That the school authorities have the right and the duty to
screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness
to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered
society, can not be doubted. One's associates, past and present,
as well as one's conduct may properly be considered in determin-
ing fitness and loyalty.3 7
It is worthy of consideration that in the field of public school
teachers additional grounds for requiring loyalty from employees can
be urged that have not heretofore been recognized by the court. The
court in the Adler case seemed to treat school teachers as any other
civil servant. The Court made mention of loyalty as fitness necessary
to maintain the integrity of the school system.38 Aside from this in-
cidental statement, the language parallels that in the Garner case.
As has been seen, a school teacher must at all times hold himself
above reproach. His conduct must be a lesson to his students in the
ideals which the school system seeks to impart to those it is training.
The board of education should not be required to retain in the class-
room, impliedly vouching for his conduct, one who by example teaches
students that which they should not learn. Membership in a subversive
organization is a violation of the duty to teach honesty and patriotism.
Some cases have recognized this. 39 Of course, once a teacher is found
disloyal, and it is admitted he may be discharged, it could be said that
the exact reasoning on which the discharge is based is unimportant.
But a recognition of the fact that the status of the teacher differs from
that of other civil servants in his relation to public and pupil has far
reaching implications in a consideration of the constitutionality of the
methods of ascertaining that loyalty. The reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in this area is still to be considered.
V. USE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AS GROUND FOR DISmISSAL
A. Use of the Privilege in General
Often a teacher is discharged for refusal to answer questions as
to his loyalty. These questions may be asked by the Board of Edu-
cation or by some other lawfully constituted body, such as a legis-
lative committee. Before any conclusions can be reached as to the
correctness of the discharge, the nature of the privilege against self-
incrimination and its purpose and place in our system of jurisprudence
should be ascertained.
It is clear that the purpose of the privilege is not to protect the
37342 U.S. at 493.
38 However, in the Slochower Case, the Court refused to give effect to the
logical implication of this statement.
39 Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952) ; (also see opinion of lower
court in this case, 99 Pitt. Leg. J .445 (1952)) ; Reinecke v. Lapen, 77 F. Supp.
333 (D.C. Hawaii 1948).
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guilty since the purpose of the entire criminal procedure is to ap-
prehend and punish malfactors. The privilege is to protect the in-
nocent. Dean Wigmore describes its operation thus:
The real objection is that any system of administration
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory
self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally
thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such
evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation
of the other sources. The exercise of the power to extract
answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that
power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds
a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and tor-
ture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be
a right to the expected answer, that is, to a confession of
guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse;
ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments
of a bad system.
40
The privilege enjoys a preferred position in this country. It is
considered more as a constitutionally secured right than as a privilege. 4 1
The purpose of the privilege itself is to protect from prosecution the
person who invokes it. There is no constitutional guarantee that one
who sees fit to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination shall be
entitled to do so in private or without notoriety. The person must
recognize the fact that his use of the privilege will probably cause
the loss of his reputation. 42 There can be no doubt that the public
usually does draw unfavorable inferences from the use of the pri-
vilege.
It is often stated that no inference may be drawn from the invo-
40 \ViGlaoRE, EVIDENCE §2251 (3rd Ed. 1940). To like effect see Byse, Teachers
and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 871 (1954); Drury v. Hurley,
339 Il1. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949) ; School v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 102 S.W.
248 (1907) ; Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 351 (1956).
41 Thus, the existence of a privilege which would otherwise be enjoyed cannot
be conditioned on the invasion of this right. Although the formation of a
corporation is a "privilege" granted by the state, a statute which called for
revocation of a corporation charter when the officials of that corporation
refused to waive their self incrimination right was invalid. State v. Simmons
Hardware Co., 109 Mo. 118, 18 S.W. 1125 (1891). A statute called for the
revocation of the liquor licenses ("privileges") of persons who claimed their
right against self incrimination when called to testify before the liquor
commission. The court said that no law can be valid which directly or in-
directly compels a party to incriminate himself. Pick v. Cargill, 167 N.Y. 391,
60 N.E. 775 (1901). On the practice of making the exercise of a right
depend upon the forefiture of a privilege, see Frost and Frost Trucking Co.
v. Railroad Comm., 271 U.S. 583 (1925). Obviously, the exercise of any
other right can not be made dependent on the waiver of the right against
self incrimination. Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 763, 126 N.E.2d 100(1955) (teacher in private schools) ; In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d
543 (1951) (lawyer). But a lawyer may be disbarred for asserting privilege
in bad faith: In re Levy, In re Becker, 255 N.Y. 223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931).
For the argument as applied to public school teachers see Note, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 1190 (1953).
42Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954). See Faxon v. School
Committee, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
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cation of the privilege. Upon reflection it becomes apparent that this
statement is not literally correct. It is more accurate to say that the
privilege as spelled out in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution forbids any official from basing action on an inference
drawn from its use.4 3 This is supported on the proposition that the
federal constitution sought to give the greatest possible protection to
the accused. It is not based on the idea that no logical inference could
be drawn from its use. The United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that permission to draw an inference does not violate Four-
teenth Amendment due process if the state statute or constitution per-
mits such inference.44 This attitude seems logical enough in view of
the the probability that most users of the privilege are guilty.45 At
any rate there seems to be no great need to debate the reasonableness
of this attitude if the drawer of the inference is confined to merely
making further inquiry once suspicions have been aroused. This seems
to be the requirement of the courts that will not allow the Board of
Education to draw a conclusive presumption from a teacher's invo-
cation of the privilege in loyalty inquiry.46 However, the courts can
hardly deny the Board's right to make further inquiry once its sus-
picions are thus aroused.4 7
B. Refusal to Answer Loyalty Questions of
Legislative Committees
Quite often the Board of Education seeks to discharge a teacher
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in testimony be-
fore a legislative committee. The leading case in this field is Slo-
43Laba v. Board of Education of Newark, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957);
Davis v. The University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Contra, Spence, dissenting in Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494,
304 P.2d 1015 (1956).
4 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 1908); Adamson v. People of Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). For an interesting analysis see State v. Baker,
115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1957).
45 It is not necessarily true that a person who claims the privilege is either
guilty or a perjurer (claiming under oath that he has the privilege when in
fact he does not). But it may be true depending on the facts. It is possible
that the person has innocently committed an ambiguous act which could be
used as a link in a chain of evidence to show his guilt. A handy example can
can be found in a loyalty inquiry. See Byse, supra note 40. Being a member
of the Communist Party is not itself a crime. 64 STAT. 991 §783(f). But
being a member of an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of
the government with knowledge of its purpose is a crime. Supra, note 36.
If a person were a member of the Communist party without knowledge of its
purpose, he would be innocent of crime, and an affirmative answer to a
question of past party membership would not incriminate him. However, it
would be important evidence in a criminal prosecution. Obviously, here a
person could legitimately invoke the privilege and be guilty of no crime.
However, just as logically he could invoke the privilege and be guilty of a
crime. The latter would seem more often to be the case rather than the
former.
46 Laba v. Board of Education of Newark, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957);
Davis v. The University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
47 Kaplan. v. School District, 388 Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 672 (1957).
1958]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
chower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York,
where a public school teacher was summarily discharged in pur-
suance of a provision of the city charter for invoking the Fifth
Amendment when asked questions as to his loyalty by a congressional
sub-committee. The charter made the discharge mandatory. The
United States Supreme Court held that the charter provision, and
hence the discharge, was unconstitutional. The court has not clearly
defined the exact holding in this case, and its implications are not yet
clear. Since it is controlling on all other courts it should be thoroughly
analyzed.
The decision was based on the premise that there could be no
inference of guilt from the use of the privilege. If the Board could
draw no inference of disloyalty it had no reason to believe that the
professor was not fit to continue as a teacher since it held no hearing
into the matter but purported to support the discharge on the use of
the privilege alone.
The reason for not permitting the Board to draw an inference is
an important factor to be considered. The court did not say that if
the inference were drawn the right given by the Fifth Amendment
would be infringed. It did say that logically the conclusion of dis-
loyalty did not necessarily follow from the mere refusal to answer
the questions. The fact that the refusal to answer was based on the
Fifth Amendment rather than on comparable provisions of state con-
stitutions was unimportant, and a like result would have been reached
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even if a
state constitution privilege were used.
The Supreme Court has said that even in criminal cases, with the
high degree of proof required, an inference of guilt can be drawn
from the use of the privilege against self-incrimination without offend-
ing due process. 48 The Slochower case, in denying such an inference
when the privilege was invoked before legislative committee, could
have been dependent on the particular facts of that case. The ques-
tions involved concerned the professor's activities twelve years before.
Apparently he had been loyal at least since that time. Moreover, the
details of his activity during the time in question were known to the
officials of the university during the time of his employment, since
the professor had testified at a state legislative committee ten years
prior to testifying before the Congressional Committee. Clearly his
dismissal was arbitrary if it was based on an inference from the in-
vocation of the privilege. There could be no inference when the facts
were known.
The facts of the case reveal the arbitrary element of the inference.
The court condemned the charter provision in th following words:
4 Cases cited supra, note 44.
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As intrpreted and applied by the state courts, it operates to
discharge every city employee who invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment. In practical effect the questions asked are taken as con-
fessed and made the basis of the discharge. No consideration
is given to such factors as the subject matter of the questions,
remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or justifi-
cation for exercise of the privilege, It matters not whether the
pleas resulted from mistake, inadvertence or legal advice con-
scientiously given, whether wisely or unwisely. The heavy
hand of the statute falls alike on all who exercise their consti-
tutional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every person is
entitled to receive.49
State courts are split on the proper interpretation of this decision.
Before Slochower the cases were uniform that such a dismissal was
constitutional,50 so the problem is solely one of interpretation of this
single decision. The Supreme Court of New Jersey5' has held that the
assertion by a teacher of his constitutional privilege before a Con-
gressional committee does not constitute an admission of guilt or jus-
tify automatic dismissal. An inquiry by the Board of Education into
the circumstance of the assertion of the privilege with no regard as
to the truth of the matter in issue could not be sufficient to justify a
dismissal. It appears that the sole ground for dismissal recognized by
the court is disloyalty.
A more reasonable appraisal of the Slochower decision was made in
Board of Education v. Mass:
We understand the holding of the Slochower case to be that
a public employee may be dismissed for invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination only if, after a full hearing in which
he is afforded an opportunity to explain his reasons for claiming
the privilege, it is determined that his refusal to answer is
sufficient under the circumstances to warrant dismissal.5 2
The California court based this conclusion on the statement that under
the New York provision no consideration was given to the circum-
stances of the case or the reason for use of the privilege, and hence
no opportunity was given to dispel any inference arising from use of
the privilege.
An inference that the teacher using the privilege against self in-
crimination is guilty of disloyalty is not always justified, as the facts
of the Slochower case so graphically demosntrate. Hence a general
rule or regulation such as in Slochower calling for mandatory dis-
missal for use of the privilege could not be upheld on the basis of a
49 350 U.S. at 558.
50 Annot., supra, note 13; Board of Education v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App.2d 732,
277 P.2d 943 (1954) ; Board of Education v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal. App.2d 100,
270 P.2d 82 (1954).51 Laba v. Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957).
5247 Cal.2d 494, 304 P.2d 1015 at 1019 (1956).
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conclusive presumption of guilt. A person could use the privilege and
still be innocent. However, a hearing to determine loyalty in which the
sole issue was the circumstance of the assertion of the privilege would
seem to satisfy due process, since it would be ascertained whether the
circumstance justify the inference. There could then be no objection
that the assertion may have come from mistake or inadvertence. It
would seem that it would be more fair to the teacher not to restrict
the hearing to the circumstances of the use of the privilege but rather
to extend it to complete issue of disloyalty.
The Slochower case, by imposing a duty on the teacher to answer
only the questions of the Board of Education overlooked some force-
ful arguments for imposing a duty on a public school teacher to answer
all incriminating questions of any proper investigating body. A con-
sideration of analogous situations would be proper. A policeman has
the duty to answer incriminating questions, not only of his superiors,
but ot a grand jury or any other official body. 3 If the policeman
were allowed to withhold information relating to his unlawful ac-
tivity and to keep his job, society would not be able to protect itself.
Obviously, it would be inconsistent to permit the policeman to retain
his job of investigating crime but to remain silent about his own crime.
On the other hand, a lawyer does not, by the nature of his particular
relation to the state, have the duty of waiving the privilege and hence
is not subject to disbarment for refusal to do so. 4 Although he is
considered an offiicer of the court, he is not as such a servant of the
state. The public school teacher would seem to have a duty to the
state not as stringent as that of the policeman, but more demanding
than that of a lawyer. He is an employee of the state, entrusted with
the obligation to uphold the integrity and work for the betterment of
the education system. Legislative committees and other bodies which
are empowered to inquire as to the teacher's conduct, are also seeking
these objectives. It would seem that it would be only reasonable to re-
quire the teacher to cooperate fully with these bodies in achieving
their mutual end. Knowledge by the proper state agencies relating to
his loyalty would seem imperative. But Slochower has said no such
duty to testify to bodies other than the Board of Education can be im-
posed on the public school teacher.
Additional grounds can be advanced for discharging a teacher for
use of the privilege against self incrimination. Teachers must possess
qualifications other than academic proficiency and loyalty. Once they
lose their reputation for honesty, morality, and patriotism, they can
53 Drury v. Hurley, 339 I11. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949) ; School v. Bell, 125
Ky. 750, 102 S.W. 248 (1907); Sounder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa.2,
156 Atl. 246 (1931); Cristal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. 564, 92 P.2d
416 (1949).
54 In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941).
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not do an efficient job in the classroom and, hence, lack the essential
qualifications for members of the teaching profession. The public is
bound to draw an unfavorable inference from the use of the privilege
when questions relating to loyalty are asked. The court should allow
the Board of Education to recognize that the public in general and the
students in particular will probably conclude that the teacher is dis-
loyal. However, as Slochower showed, a conclusion of loss of con-
fidence is not a necessary deduction for the use of privilege, since the
public may know the whole story and refuse to draw the inference.
Hence a statute providing for summary dismissal for the use of the
privilege would be unreasonable. But if an inquiry by the Board of
Education disclosed that such disqualifying public sentiment did exist,
it would not seem constitutionally objectionable to discharge the teach-
er.55 Possibly it would be more fair to the teacher for the Board to
hold an inquiry into the entire issue of disloyalty, but a hearing re-
stricted to the scope above indicated would seem to be constitutional.
Such a ground for discharge is a possibility that a teacher should keep
in mind when testifying before legislative committees. Such a con-
sideration may prompt him to waive the immunity and testify fully.
Obviously, if he were in fact guilty he would not be likely to do so.
But in that case he should not retain his job. If he had the fear of
being engulfed by ambiguous circumstances he would be well advised
to testify fully in the hope of allaying whatever suspicions that might
otherwise arise.
C. Refusal to Answer Loyalty Questions of
the Board of Education
In the recent decision of Beilan v. Board of Education,56 the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that a public school teacher may
be discharged for failure to answer a question asked him by the Board
of Education concerning that teacher's loyalty. That the refusal to
testify to the Board was based on possible self-incrimination is un-
important when the issue is solely the correctness of the teacher's dis-
charge. This decision is in accord with the uniform holding of the
lower courts.5
7
55 Faxon v. School Committee of Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
This case was subsequently considered in Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass.
785, 127 N.E.2d 663 (1956).
56 78 Sup. Ct. 1317 (1958).57 Annot., supra, note 13; Board of Education v. Cooper, 136 Cal. App.2d 80(1955) ; Davis v. The University of Kansas City, 129 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mo.
1955); Steinmitz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816, 285
P.2d 617 (1955) ; Laba v. The Board of Education of Newark, 23 N.J. 364,
129 A.2d 273 (1957); Adler v. Wilson, 282 App. Div. 418, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 655(1953) ; Paplan v. School District, 388 Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 726 (1957). A refusal
to answer may be found to be a violation of the general grounds listed for
dismissal in the statutes; "lack of professional fitness" (Paplan) ; "oncompe-
tency" (Beilan); "adequate cause" (Davis). Refusual to answer loyalty
questions at a grievance hearing is not "just Cause" for remmoval under col-
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The discharge in the case of the refusal to answer the Board's
questions is not based on any inference of guilt therefrom. If no in-
ference could be made from the assertion of the privilege before a
legislative committee, clearly none could be made under these similar
circumstances.
The discharge is based on a violation of a duty which his position
imposes on the teacher. He must, under the pain of discharge, answer
pertinent questions as to his qualifications for continued employment.
To be constitutional the requirement must be reasonable. The public
school teacher works for the state, which has undertaken the job of
providing a good educational system for its citizens in the interest of
the common good. The state is spending tax money in pursuance of
this aim, and in so doing has acquired a moral obligation to provide
a system that will produce well-trained, honest, patriotic men and
women. The student is entrusting his future to the educational system.
This again enforces an extraordinary responsibility upon the state.
The Board of Education is charged with making education function.
Hence it is on the Board that the moral duty is realistically imposed.
It must make sure that the teaching staff is competent. Therefore it
must weed out professionally unfit teachers.
There rests with the Board the power and duty to inquire into the
revelant qualifications of a teacher. There is the reciprocal duty on the
part of the teacher to cooperate fully and frankly. His job is to help
provide a proper educational system for the community; to assist the
Board in its task. This includes disqualifying himself when necessary.
He may not block the Board's proper inquiry by secretiveness and
concealment."0 He has the right not to answer loyalty questions, but
the duty to do so." Naturally this inquisitorial power of the Board of
Education is not unlimited. It is conferred by the nature of the
Board's purpose, and hence, it is limited thereby. The proper area of
inquiry is any matter necessary in determining fitness of a teacher.
Loyalty is such a necessary qualification.
Is any question relating to loyalty within this area? Being a mem-
ber of a subversive organization with no knowledge of its purpose is
not disloyalty. But a question concerning mere membership with no
mention of knowledge of purpose of the organization would legally
justify the use of the privilege. However, an affirmative answer alone
would not be ground for dismissal. 61 A refusal to answer such a ques-
lective bargaining contract in private industry. Comment, 11 RUTGERS L. REV.
745 (1956).
5s The Beilan case, supra, note 56, and all the cases in note 57, supra, so held.
However, the Kaplan case indicated an inference could be drawn.59 Laba v. Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957); Beilan v.
Board of Education, 78 Sup. Ct. 1317 (1958).60 Cristal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. 364, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
61 Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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tion is ground for removal, since the matter is a proper subject of
inquiry.62 The question as to whether a teacher is a present member
of a subversive organization is related to the questions of whether he
is presently a member with knowledge of its purpose and is pre-
liminary thereto. The answer to such a question would normally in-
dicate whether any further inquiry with respect to membership with
knoweldge of the organization's purpose or personal advocation of
violent overthrow was necessary.
The argument is often advanced that an inquiry by the Board of
Education into a teacher's political loyalties is a violation of academic
freedom.6 3 It is probably true that the chief reason for tenure of a
teacher is the same as for tenure of a judge. Certainly the teacher
must be free from the passions of the moment to exercise independent
judgment if he is to perform his proper role in the education process. 4
But it is certainly incorrect to consider the discharge of a teacher for
disloyalty as an attempt by the Board of Education to interefere with
academic freedom. Such approach is actually only a sophisticated ar-
gument that disloyalty is not a ground for discharge. A teacher must
be loyal to the state in order to be able to teach the ideals of honesty
and patriotism.
VI. LOYALTY OATHS
The use of the loyalty oath eliminates the necessity of detailed
hearings by the Board of Education in order to determine a teacher's
loyalty. This device simply requires the teacher, as a condition of em-
ployment, to take a certain prescribed oath relating to loyalty. If the
teacher be disloyal, he is unable (in theory) to take the oath and
therefore is disqualified.
The use of the loyalty oath system itself as a means of determin-
ing qualifications is constitutional, providing that the requirements
that must be sworn to do not violate due process.65 The usual form
requires the swearing that one does not believe in the propriety of the
62 Orange Coast Junior College District v. St. John, 146 Cal. App.2d 549, 303 P.2d
1056 (1956); Board of Education v. Cooper, 136 Cal. App. 2d 513, 289 P.2d
80 (1955); Steinmetz v. California State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d
816, 285 P.2d 617 (1955).63 Laba v. Board of Education, 23 N.J. 364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957); Thorp v.
Board of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951); Byse, supra, note 40.
64 Finkelkor and Stockdale, supra, note 1.
6 5 Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 268 (1951); Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249
P.2d 292 (1952) ; Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951) ;
Dwarker v. Cleveland Board of Education, 108 N.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. Ohio
1951); Pickus v. Board of Education, 9 Ill.2d 599, 138 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
Local oath requirements have been held invalid on the ground that a compre-
hensive statute was intended to be exclusive: Fraxer v. Regents of University
of California, 39 Cal.2d 717, 249 P.2d 284 (1952); Tolman v. Underhill, 39
Cal.2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952). Loyalty oath requirements as applied to
those other than teachers have been held valid: candidates for public office,
Grende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1950) ; all civil servants, Garner
v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Fitzgerald v. City of Phila-
delphia, 387 Pa. 379, 102 A.2d 887 (1954).
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violent overthrow of the government and is not knowingly a member
of any organization with such aim. Any deviation from this form re-
quiring additional qualifications as to loyalty may make the oath con-
stitutionally objectionable. Since the refusal to take the oath results
in automatic discharge, the requirements for the oath must be such as
would justify a dismissal if such fact were found by the Board of
Education after a hearing. Obviously, present belief in, or advocation
of, the violent overthrow of the government would brand the person
disloyal and justify his dismissal. Membership in an organization with
such aims, provided there is personal knowledge of its purpose, is
equivalent to personal belief and, hence, would justify dismissal. This
requirement of personal knowledge is essential. 66 Disavowal implies
certainty. A person could be un-certain that he does not belong to
such a subversive organization, because he could belong to such an
organization with no knowledge of its purpose. If he takes an oath
that does not require that the membership be with knowledge of pur-
pose, he could perjure himself. If he were uncertain and did not take
the oath he would be fired for what might be mere membership without
the requisite knowledge. This is not ground for removal since it is not
disloyal to belong to a subversive organization without knowledge of
its purpose. The problem becomes more difficult when the oath re-
quirement relates to past membership. A person may have joined an
organization and quit when he learned of its purpose. Or he may have
been a member of a lawful organization which, after he severed con-
nection with it, became disloyal. Present and future conduct may be
judged by past conduct, 67 so past membership with knowledge of the
organization's purpose may be ground for dismissal. But, again, past
membership with ignorance of purpose can be no indication of present
or future disloyalty. The purpose of inquiring as to membership in
the past is to prevent a person from claiming that he severed member-
ship just prior to taking the oath.
VII. BILLS OF ATTAINDER AND Ex POST FACTO LAWS
It is often contended, always unsuccessfully, that statutes requiring
loyalty oaths are bills of attainder or ex post facto laws which are
prohibited to the states by the United States Constitution.
A bill of attainder was defined in United States v. Lovett:
Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members
66 Wieman v. Updegraph, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Thorp v. Board of Trustees,
6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462 (1951), it was stated that the teacher was protected
in that there was a requirement of knowledge of falsely swearing for con-
viction of perjury.
67 Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952). See Garner v.
Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); and Adler v. Board of Edu-
cation, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them with-
out a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Con-
stitution. 8
Statutes requiring loyalty oaths are never bills of attainder due to their
content but their form resembles that set forth in the above definition.
All of the school teachers of the state, all civil servants, all lawyers,
etc., would be a group. Those to whom the statute was to apply
would be easily ascertained by their failure to take the oath.6" There-
fore, if a statute inflicted punishment on them for their failure to take
a prescribed oath, it would be unconstitutional. But loyalty oaths
statutes are constitutional since they don't inflict punishment.
Statutes requiring oaths as to past loyalty could also take the form
of an ex post facto law.
By an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a pun-
ishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed; or imposes additional punishment to that pre-
scribed; or changes the rule of evidence by which less or dif-
ferent testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.7 0
If disloyalty were not ground for dismissal at one time, an assumption
valid for this discussion, and later the same disloyalty was declared to
be a disqualification, such a declaration would be ex post facto in opera-
tion- if it imposed punishment as a result.
A loyalty oath statute can not be a bill of attainder or an ex post
facto law since it does not impose punishment. The deprivation of
any right, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment.
The circumstances attending and the cause of the deprivation deter-
mine the fact.7 ' Punishment is in fact inflicted when there is an intent
to inflict it, that is, when the infringement of the right is motivated
by an intent to inflict punishment. The circumstances of each case in-
dicate whether or not the punitive intent is present. Where there is
such a relationship between the past conduct and the right affected that
it can be said that the past conduct indicates lack of ability or capacity
for the proper exercise of the function, there is no punishment. The
intent of the restriction is not to harm the individual but to protect the
public. Therefore, punishment is not imposed by a general regulation
which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for
employment.7 Past loyalty may be used as a basis of qualification for
future employment.
68 328 U.S. at 315.
69 Cummings v. the State of Missouri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1866). See Note, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 1190 (1953), and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1866).70 4 Wall. (U.S.) at 325 and 326. See Annot., supra, note 65.71 Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1866). This view
was reaffirmed in Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
72 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). This was recognized
in both the Cummings and Garland Decisions, and applied in Dent v. West
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. . . [T]he individuals . . . are subject to possible loss of
positions only because there is a substantial ground for the
Congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be
transformed into future conduct .... [T]he history of the past
conduct is the foundation for the judgment as to what the future
conduct is likely to be. .... 73
Questions by the Board of Education are relevant when they deal
with past conduct. Therefore, requirements in loyalty oaths making
past disloyalty ground for removal does not offend due process since
it is reasonable to believe that past conduct is an indication of present
and future conduct. The past conduct must reasonably indicate that
future conduct will adversely affect the interest of society. This is the
same logical relationship that is necessary for the oath to satisfy the
demands of due process. Today loyalty oath statutes are never de-
feated as bills of attainder.7 4 If the language of the statute satisfies
due process, the court gives only incidental attention to the bill of
attainder of ex post facto contention.
7 5
VIII. FREEDOr OF SPEECH
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving its
citizens of liberty without due process of law. Included within the
term "liberty" is freedom of thought and of expression. These rights
as well as the right to continued government employment on reason-
able terms, must not be infringed in an unconstitutional manner by
the Board of Education in its loyalty proceedings.
Freedom of thought and speech are infringed if the expression of
mere unpopular beliefs and thoughts would constitute grounds for
discharge.G But freedom of speech and thought, like all rights to be
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), upholding a statute elevating standards of
qualifications to practice medicine, and Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898), upholding a statute forbidding practice of medicine by any person
who had been convicted of a felony.
73 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For
a criticism of this, see Warmuth, supra, note 29. That any disability to hold
public employment is punishment, see Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1190 (1953).
74 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In State of Missouri v. Heigh-
land, 41 Mo. 388 (1867), the same oath that was considered in Cummings was
a bill of attainder as applied to a teacher, but it was not stated whether the
teacher was employed in public or private schools. This seems to be the only
case involving a teacher where an oath requirement was unconstitutional as a
bill of attainder. It should be noted that this case was decided before the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
75Annot., supra, note 65; Board of Education v. Cooper, 136 Cal. App.2d 513,
289 P.2d 80 (1955); Orange Coast Junior College District v. St. John, 146
Cal. App.2d 549, 303 P.2d 1056 (1956); Pickus v. Board of Education, 9
Ill.2d 500, 138 N.E.2d 532 (1956); Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498,
79 A.2d 462 (1951). A statute or rule requiring discharge if the teacher
refuses to answer loyalty questions can not be a bill of attainder or an ex post
facto law since there the act to be punished (assuming that there is punish-
ment involved) is committed after the statute is passed. Faxon v. School
Committee, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954) ; Opinion of the Justices,
332 Mass. 785, 127 N.E.2d 663 (1956).
76 Some cases state that there is no infringement of freedom of speech or belief,
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enjoyed in organized society, is not absolute.7 7 The rights of the public
must be protected.78  It is true that speech and thought, considered in
the abstract, occupy a preferred place in our constitutional scheme, and
considered alone deserve great protection.7 0 However, in a loyalty in-
quiry more than the speech and thought are involved. The state does
not fear the immediate results of the speech, but rather seeks to prevent
the harmful conduct which it believes will be practiced by those who
entertain beliefs and engage in speech relating to the urging of the
violent overhrow of the government. The speech and belief are mere-
ly means of identification. 0
Another important factor to be considered in determining the ex-
tent of allowable infringement on speech is the nature of its effect.8'
Do we have a sufficiently serious effect on speech in the element of
loss of a job? The court has given help which assists with an answer
to the question.
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of pub-
lic order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional
partial abridgement of speech the duty of the courts is to de-
termine which of these two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances present.
. . . [L]egitimate attempts to protect the public not from the
remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but from present
excess of direct, active conduct are not presumptively bad be-
if the only result is discharge. Pickus v. Board of Education, 9 Ill.2d 599,
137 N.E.2d 532 (1956); Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
7 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Emerson and Helfield,
supra, note 5.
78 The right of the Public to be protected from evils of conduct, even though
First Amendment rights of persons or groups are thereby in some manner
infringed, has been frequently and consistently recognized by the Court. The
blaring sound truck invades the privacy of the home and may drown out
others who wish to be heard. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). An un-
authorized parade through city streets by a religious or political group dis-
rupts traffic and may prevent the discharge of essential obligations of the
local government. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). The
exercise of particular First Amendment rights may fly in the face of the
public interest in the health of children (children forbidden to sell news-
papers), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), or of the whole com-
munity, (compulsory vaccination), Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905); and it may be offensive to the moral standard of the community(bigamous Marriage), Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); or the First Amendment Rights may con-
flict with the government's interest in the character of members of the bar,
In re Summers, 326 U.S. 561 (1945).
79 See in particular, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Holmes
dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Brandeis, con-
curring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
80American Communications v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
SlIn Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the court adopted judge
Learned Hand's statement: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
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cause they interfere with, and, in some of its manifestations,
restrain the exercise of First Amendment rights . 2
The courts have put the interest of the teacher and the public into the
judicial scale and have determined that if the teacher is to retain his
beliefs he must look for employment elsewhere S3 This is only a partial,
indirect invasion of the teacher's rights. The public has a great in-
terest to be protected. To hold otherwise would be to allow freedom
of speech and thought to thwart the Board of Education in fulfilling
its duty of maintaining the school system. That is absurd.
IX. CONCLUSION
It should be apparent that before a determination can be made as
to the constitutionality of acts to test loyalty of teachers or of moves
to dismiss for loyalty reasons there must be a thorough analysis of
each fact situation. It would appear that thus far the courts have not
given proper attention to certain aspects of the problem. Certainly in
a great many instances dismissal of teachers is constitutional.
JOHN P. MILLER
82 American Communications Association v. Douds, 349 U.S. 382, at 399 (1950).
S Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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